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Abstract. In this paper, we establish the existence of Berge’s strong equilibrium for
games with n persons in infinite dimensional strategy spaces in the case where the payoff
function of each player is quasi-concave. Moreover, we study the continuity of Berge’s
strong equilibrium correspondence and prove that most of Berge’s strong games are
essential.
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1. Introduction
The concept of Nash equilibrium goes back to the paper of Nash (1951). For a nonco-
operative game, it is an equilibrium which is stable with respect to the deviation of any
unique player. To get stronger stability properties, many concepts were introduced; let us
quote for example the essential equilibrium (Wu and Jiang, 1962), the perfect equilibrium
(Selten, 1975), and the proper equilibrium (Myerson, 1978). But already in 1957, on the
basis of the notion of equilibrium for a partition P with respect to the coalition K of
players, Berge (1957) defined the concept of Berge’s strong equilibrium which insures a
stronger stability than Nash’s equilibrium. Indeed, a Berge strong equilibrium is stable
with respect to the deviation of all players except one. Using the same idea, Zhukovskii
(1994) introduced the concept of “Berge equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii” as an al-
ternative solution for a noncooperative game when it has no Nash equilibrium or when it
has several Nash equilibria. This equilibrium means that if each player plays his strategy
at a Berge equilibrium, then he obtains the maximum payoff if all the remaining players
play their strategy in the Berge equilibrium. It is worth noticing that Berge’s strong equi-
librium verifies stronger stability than the Aumann (1959) strong equilibrium and that
the Berge equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii (1994) is totally different from the Nash
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equilibrium and the Berge strong equilibrium. For more details on Berge’s strong equilib-
rium, see Krim (2001), Abalo and Kostreva (2004, 2005), Larbani et al (2007), Larbani
and Nessah (2008).
The existence of Berge strong equilibrium and of essential equilibrium were respectively
studied in Larbani and Nessah (2001) and in Wu and Jiang (1962). In their paper, Larbani
and Nessah provide an existence result for the Berge equilibrium of a noncooperative game
in normal form. The strategy space is a finite dimensional space and the payoff function
of each person is continuous and concave. Wu and Jiang prove that every finite game
can be closely approximated by an essential game. More precisely, let x and x′ be Nash
equilibria of the noncooperative games G and G′ respectively. x is said to be essential
when the following condition is satisfied: if G′ is ”close” to G, then x′ is ”close” to x. G is
essential if all of its equilibria are essential. Note that this definition requires a topological
structure on the spaces of games and issues. To this end, Wu and Jiang parametrize games
by payoffs and issues as well. Then, using the upper semi-continuous property of the Nash
equilibrium correspondence, they prove that most of the games are essential in the sense
of Baire Category. Later, Yu (1999) extended the result found in Wu and Jiang (1962)
not only to games defined in infinite dimensional spaces but also to other more general
parametrizations of games such as: payoff profiles, payoff profiles and strategy sets, payoff
profiles and feasible correspondences.
The aim of this paper is double.
First, we extend the existence result of Larbani and Nessah (2001) to infinite dimensional
topological vector spaces, and we prove under weaker conditions on the payoff function
the existence of Berge’s strong equilibrium for noncooperative games in normal form and
for abstract economies. With the local convexity of the strategy spaces, the proof is based
on the Kakutani-Fan fixed point theorem. Without local convexity, the idea of the proof
is inspired from Yu (1999) and consists in constructing a sequence of correspondences
which verifies the Browder-Fan fixed point theorem (see Browder (1968), Theorem 1);
then, passing to limit on the sequence of fixed points, we prove the existence of a Berge
strong equilibrium.
Secondly, we prove, as in Yu, that most of Berge’s strong equilibria of games are essen-
tial.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the Berge’s strong equilibrium
and give sufficient conditions for its existence. In Section 3, we prove the continuity of
the Berge strong equilibrium correspondence. In Section 4, we study the essential Berge
strong equilibria and games. Finally Section 5 is a short concluding section.
2. Definition and existence of Berge’s strong equilibrium
2.1. Berge’s strong equilibrium of a noncooperative game. Let us consider the
following noncooperative game in normal form:
G =
(
I, (Xi, ui)i∈I
)
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where I = {1, · · · , n} is a finite set of players, Xi is the set of strategies of player i and, if
X =
∏n
i=1Xi denotes the set of issues of the game G, ui : X → R is the payoff function
of i. As usual, we let I \ {i} = {1, · · · , i− 1, i+ 1, · · · , n} = {j ∈ I : j 6= i} and we denote
X−i =
∏
j∈I\{i}Xj , and, if x ∈ X =
∏n
i=1Xi, x−i = (xj)j 6=i ∈ X−i. Choosing a strategy
xi ∈ Xi, the aim of each player in the game G is to maximize his payoff function.
Recall that x ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium of the game G if for every i ∈ I, for all xi ∈ Xi,
ui (x) ≥ ui(xi, x−i). The following definition is due to Berge (1957).
Definition 2.1 (Berge (1957)). A Berge’s strong equilibrium of the game G is an n-tuple
of strategies x ∈ X such that ∀i ∈ I,∀j ∈ I \ {i},∀y−i ∈ X−i, uj(x) ≥ uj(xi,, y−i).
In other words, while at a Nash equilibrium no one of the players has interest to modify
alone his strategy, at a Berge’s strong equilibrium, for each player i, it is the complementary
coalition which has no interest to deviate.
Remark 2.2. It is easily seen that a Berge’s strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium
and it is obvious that they coincide in games with two persons (see Larbani and Nessah
(2001)).
In the following example, we show that a game may have Nash equilibria and no one
Berge’s strong equilibrium.
Example 2.3. Let us consider the following noncooperative game with three persons:
(I, (Xi)3i=1, (ui)
3
i=1),
where Xi = [0, 1] for each i = 1, 2, 3 and u1(x) = x1, u2(x) = 3x31 − x3, u3(x) = x2 + x3.
We prove by contraposition that there is no Berge’s strong equilibrium. Indeed, if x is a
Berge’s strong equilibrium, we must have in particular for each x2 ∈ X2 and x3 ∈ X3,
u2(x) ≥ u2(x1, x2, x3),
u3(x) ≥ u3(x1, x2, x3).
Then, for every (x2, x3) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1], x3 ≥ x3 and x2 + x3 ≥ x2 + x3, which implies
x3 = 0 and x2 + x3 ≥ 2. We obtain a contradiction. However, any x = (1, t, 1) where
t ∈ [0, 1] is a Nash equilibrium.
Next, we give sufficient conditions for the existence of Berge’s strong equilibrium. From
now on, we assume that each strategy set Xi is a subset of a (possibly infinite dimensional)
Hausdorff, non necessarily locally convex, topological vector space Ei. For each i, let us
denote by u−i the vector (uj)j 6=i of utility functions of the members of I \ {i} and call
best reply correspondence for the complementary coalition I \ {i} the correspondence
Γ−i : X → X defined by:
(2.1) Γ−i(x) = {y ∈ X : u−i(xi, y−i) ≥ u−i(xi, t−i) ∀t−i ∈ X−i} .
For each x ∈ X, we set
(2.2) Γ(x) =
⋂
i∈I
Γ−i(x).
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With these notations, a Berge’s strong equilibrium is a fixed point of the correspondence
Γ, that is an-tuple x ∈ Γ(x).
Theorem 2.4. Assume the following assumptions on G:
A.1: For each i ∈ I, Xi is a nonempty, convex and compact subset of Ei;
A.2: For each i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ I \ {i}, ∀xi ∈ Xi, the function y−i → uj(xi, y−i) is
quasi-concave on X−i;
A.3: For each i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ I \ {i}, the function uj is upper semicontinuous on
Xi ×X−i;
A.4: For each i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ I \ {i},∀x−i ∈ X−i, the function yi → uj(yi, x−i) is lower
semicontinuous on Xi;
A.5: ∀x ∈ X, Γ(x) 6= 6©.
Then, there exists a Berge’s strong equilibrium.
Proof. Let us first assume that each strategy space Ei is locally convex. We remark that,
under the assumptionsA.1 –A.4 of the theorem, each correspondence Γ−i is convex valued
but may have empty values. Under these assumptions, the correspondence Γ is closed1
(thus upper semicontinuous with compact values) and the set F = {x ∈ X : Γ (x) 6= 6©} is
closed in X. Indeed, it follows from assumptions A.1, A.3 and A.4 that for every i ∈ I
and for every j ∈ I \ {i}, the function:
(2.3) xi → max
t−i∈X−i
uj(xi, t−i)
is continuous (see Yu(1999), Lemma 2.4 ) or (see, Aubin (1984), Theorem 1, p. 67). The
correspondence xi → X−i is obviously continuous and an easy adaptation of the proof
of the Berge maximum theorem (see Aubin (1984), Theorem 3, p. 70, or Aliprantis and
Border (1999), Theorem 16.31) shows that the correspondence
(2.4) xi →
{
y : uj(xi,y−i) = max
t−i∈X−i
uj(xi,t−i)
}
has a closed graph. As intersection of closed correspondences, each correspondence Γ−i
is closed, thus upper semicontinuous with compact values. Consequently, if xν → x with,
for each ν of a directed set, xν ∈ F , that is, yν ∈ Γ(xν). In view of the compactness of X,
one can assume without loss of generality that yν → y and conclude that y ∈ Γ(x) and
x ∈ F . Adding now Assumption A.5, it follows from the Kakutani-Fan theorem that Γ
has a fixed point and the game G has a Berge’s strong equilibrium.
Without local convexity of the strategy spaces Ei, the idea of the proof of Theorem 2.4
is borrowed with some slight modifications from Yu (1999). Fix any integer k and define
the correspondence Wk : X → X as follows:
(2.5) Wk(x) =
{
z ∈ X : ∀i ∈ I,∀j ∈ I \ {i}, uj(xi, z−i) > max
y−i∈X−i
uj(xi,y−i)− 1
k
}
.
1For definition and properties of the different continuity concepts for correspondences, we refer the
reader to Aliprantis and Border (1999), Aubin (1984) or to the Appendix of Florenzano (2003). For
statements of classical fixed point theorems, we refer to Aliprantis and Border (1999), Florenzano (2003).
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.39
On the existence of Berge’s strong equilibrium 5
It follows from the compactness of the sets Xi and the assumptions A.3 and A.5 that
each Wk(x) is nonempty. Indeed, for every i ∈ I and for every j ∈ I \ {i}, there exists
zj ∈ X such that:
(2.6) uj(xi, z
j
−i) > max
y−i∈X−i
uj(xi,y−i)− 1
k
.
A fortiori, if z ∈ Γ(x) then z ∈Wk(x). From assumption A.2, it follows that each Wk(x)
is convex. Using assumptions A.1, A.3 and A.4 and the Berge maximum theorem, it
follows that for each i ∈ I and for each j ∈ I \ {i} the function:
xi → max
y−i∈X−i
uj(xi,y−i),
is continuous on Xi. It then follows from the inequalities defining Wk(x) in (2.5) that
z ∈ Wk(t) still holds for every t in some neighborhood of x. Applying the Browder-Fan
theorem in Browder (1968), let xk a fixed point of the correspondence Wk. Thus,
(2.7) ∀i ∈ I,∀j ∈ I \ {i}, uj(xk) = uj(xki , xk−i) > max
y−i∈X−i
uj(xki , y−i)−
1
k
.
Since each Xi is a compact, one can assume without loss of generality that the sequence
(xk)k converges to x ∈ X. Passing to limit in (2.7) and using assumption A.3 and once
more the continuity of the function max y−i ∈ X−iuj(xi,y−i), we get:
(2.8)
∀i ∈ I,∀j ∈ I \ {i}, uj(xi, x−i) ≥ lim
k→+∞
supuj(xki , x
k
−i) ≥
lim
k→+∞
max
y−i∈X−i
uj(xki , y−i).
Since
(2.9) lim
k→+∞
max
y−i∈X−i
uj(xki , y−i) = max
y−i∈X−i
uj(xi, y−i),
then
(2.10) ∀i ∈ I,∀j ∈ I \ {i}, uj(xi, x−i) = max
y−i∈X−i
uj(xi, y−i),
and x is a Berge’s strong equilibrium.
Remark 2.5. Theorem 2.4 extends to infinite dimensional strategy spaces as well as in
several other respects Theorem 3.1 in Larbani and Nessah (2001). A cautious reader can
verify that their demonstration, based on the Ky-Fan inequality (see Fan (1972)), can
be adapted to the infinite dimensional framework and to our weakened continuity and
concavity assumptions on payoff functions. Assumption A.5 in Theorem 2.4 is strong and
means that for each strategy x, there exists another strategy such that, for this strategy,
the complementary coalition has the best answer. One should note that assumption A.5 is
not satisfied by the game of the Example 2.3. Moreover, as noticed by Larbani and Nessah
(2001), this assumption is not necessary for the existence of a Berge’s strong equilibrium.
One can find in Larbani and Nessah (2001) an example of a game with Berge’s strong
equilibria that does not satisfy Assumption A.5.
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2.2. Berge’s strong equilibrium of an abstract economy. We now consider the
following generalized game that will be called abstract economy (see Borglin and Keiding
(1976)):
H =
(
I, (Xi, Fi, ui)i∈I
)
,
where I = {1, · · · , n} is a (finite) set of agents, Xi is the strategy set of agent i, and
if X =
∏
i∈I Xi, ui : X → R is the payoff function of i, while Fi : X → Xi denotes
a feasibility correspondence for i given the strategies of the other agents. The following
definition extends Definition 2.1 to abstract economies.
Definition 2.6. A Berge’s strong equilibrium of H is a n-tuple of strategies, x, such that
for each i ∈ I,
(a) xi ∈ Fi(x),
(b) ∀j ∈ I \ {i}, ∀y−i ∈
∏
j∈I\{i} Fj(x), uj(x) ≥ uj(xi, y−i).
The first condition guarantees that x is a vector of feasible strategies. If, as previously,
we call, for each i ∈ I, best reply correspondence for the complementary coalition I \ {i},
the correspondence Γ−i : X → X defined by:
Γ−i(x) =
y ∈ X : y−i ∈ ∏
j∈I\{i}
Fj(x) and u−i(xi, y−i) ≥ u−i(xi, t−i) ∀t−i ∈
∏
j∈I\{i}
Fj(x)

both conditions (a) and (b) of Definition 2.6 jointly express that
x ∈
⋂
i∈I
Γ−i(x).
Theorem 2.7. Assume the following assumptions on H:
B.1: For each i ∈ I, Ei is locally convex and Xi is a nonempty, convex and compact
subset of Ei;
B.2: For each i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ I \ {i}, ∀xi ∈ Xi, the function y−i → uj(xi, y−i) is
quasi-concave on X−i;
B.3: For each i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ I \ {i}, the function uj is continuous on Xi ×X−i;
B.4: For each i ∈ I, the correspondence Fi : X → Xi is continuous with nonempty,
convex and compact values;
B.5: ∀x ∈ X, ⋂i∈I Γ−i(x) 6= 6©.
Then H has a Berge’s strong equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is a slight modification of the proof given for Theorem 2.4 in the case
where each strategy space is locally convex. For every i ∈ I, denote by F−i : X →∏
j∈I\{i}Xj the correspondence defined by:
F−i(x) =
∏
j∈I\{i}
Fj(x).
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For every j ∈ I \ {i}, in view of the strengthened continuity assumptions on the functions
uj and the continuity of the correspondence Fi, it follows from the maximum theorem
that, for every j ∈ I \ {i}, the function:
xi → max
t−i∈F−i(x)
uj(xi, t−i)
is continuous and the correspondence:
xi →
{
y : uj(xi, y−i) = max
t−i∈F−i(x)
uj(xi, t−i)
}
has a closed graph. Once again, as intersection of closed correspondences, each correspon-
dence Γ−i is closed, thus upper semicontinuous with compact values. The same is true for
the correspondence Γ: X → X defined by Γ(x) = ⋂i∈I Γ−i(x). As by assumptions B.2
and B.5, Γ is nonempty and convex valued, the existence of the Berge’s strong equilibrium
of H follows from the Kakutani-Fan theorem.
3. Continuity properties of Berge’s strong equilibrium
In this section, we consider games parametrized by payoff profiles and abstract economies
parametrized by payoff profiles and feasibility correspondences and we prove that the
Berge’s strong equilibrium correspondence of this games is upper semicontinuous with
nonempty and compact values.
3.1. Games parametrized by payoff profiles. Let us assume that, defined on the same
strategy spaces, the games (I, (Xi)i∈I , (ui)i∈I) are parametrized by the payoff profiles.
More precisely, let U be the set of payoff profiles u = (u1, · · · , un) which satisfy the
assumptions of Theorem 2.4 and verify
∑
i∈I supx∈X | ui(x) |< ∞, endowed with the
distance ρ defined as follows: For each u1 = (u11, · · · , u1n) and u2 = (u21, · · · , u2n) ∈ U ,
(3.1) ρ(u1, u2) =
∑
i∈I
sup
x∈X
| u1i (x)− u2i (x) | .
It is easily seen that U , endowed with the distance ρ, is a complete metric space (see,
Appendix). Now, we define the Berge’s strong equilibrium correspondence F : U → X,
where for each u ∈ U, F (u) ⊂ X is the set of Berge’s strong equilibria of the game. Then,
we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. For a noncooperative game, under the assumptions of Theorem 2.4, the
Berge’s strong equilibrium correspondence, F , is upper semicontinuous with nonempty and
compact values.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 2.4 that the correspondence F has nonempty values. We
now prove that the graph of F is closed. Let (uα, xα)α∈Λ be a net of points of the graph
of F such that (uα, xα)→ (u, x) ∈ U ×X. Hence, ∀α ∈ Λ,
(3.2) ∀i ∈ I,∀j ∈ I \ {i}, uαj (xαi , xα−i) = max
t−i∈X−i
uαj (x
α
i , t−i).
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We have, for each i ∈ I and for each j ∈ I \ {i},
(3.3)
uj(xi, x−i)− uαj (xαi , xα−i) = uj(xi, x−i)− uj(xαi , xα−i)
+ uj(xαi , x
α
−i)− uαj (xαi , xα−i),
and
(3.4)
uj(xi , x−i)− uj(xαi , xα−i) + uj(xαi , xα−i)− uαj (xαi , xα−i) ≥
uj(xi , x−i)− uj(xαi , xα−i)− ρ(u, uα).
From the upper semicontinuity of the function uj , it follows that
(3.5) uj(xi, x−i) ≥ lim
α
supuj(xαi , x
α
−i).
From (3.5) and limα ρ(u, uα) = 0, we deduce:
(3.6) uj(xi, x−i)− lim
α
supuαj (x
α
i , x
α
−i) ≥ 0.
On the other hand, let ε > 0 and for each i ∈ I, j ∈ I \ {i}, take y−i ∈ X−i such that:
(3.7) uj(xi, y−i) > max
t−i∈X−i
uj(xi, t−i)− ε.
Since ρ(u, uα) → 0, xαi → xi and uj is lower semicontinuous, there exists α0 ∈ Λ with
ρ(u, uα) < ε and uj(xαi , y−i) > uj(xi, y−i)− ε for all α ≥ α0. From (3.2), we deduce:
(3.8)
u αj (x
α
i , x
α
−i) ≥ uαj (xαi , y−i) ≥ uj(xαi , y−i)− ρ(u, uα) ≥
uj(xαi , y−i)− ε ≥ uj(xi, y−i)− 2ε.
Hence,
(3.9) uαj (x
α
i , x
α
−i) > max
t−i∈X−i
uj(xi, t−i)− 3ε.
From (3.6), we obtain:
(3.10) uj(xi, x−i) ≥ lim
α
supuαj (x
α
i , x
α
−i) ≥ limα inf u
α
j (x
α
i , x
α
−i) ≥ max
t−i∈X−i
uj(xi, t−i)− 3ε.
When ε → 0, we have uj(xi, x−i) = maxt−i∈X−i uj(xi, t−i). As this is true for each i ∈ I
and for each j ∈ I \ {i}, x ∈ F (u) and the graph of F is closed. Then F has closed values
in the compact set X and is upper semicontinuous on U .
3.2. Abstract economies parametrized by payoff profiles and feasibility cor-
respondences. In this subsection, we assume (strong assumption) that each strategy
space Ei is a normed space. Let us consider the generalized game
(
I, (Fi)i∈I , (ui)i∈I
)
parametrized by payoff profiles and the feasibility strategy correspondences. More pre-
cisely, we denote by V the set of vectors v =
(
(u1, · · · , un), (F1, · · · , Fn)
)
where (u1, · · · , un)
is the payoff profile and (F1, · · · , Fn) are feasibility correspondences which satisfy the con-
ditions of Theorem 2.7.
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For each v1 = (u11, · · · , u1n, F 11 , · · · , F 1n) ∈ V , v2 = (u21, · · · , u2n, F 21 , · · · , F 2n) ∈ V , define
as in Yu (1999), p. 369, with slight modifications, the function ρ : V → R
(3.11) ρ(v1, v2) =
∑n
i=1 supx∈X | u1i (x)− u2i (x) | +
∑n
i=1 supx∈X Hi
(
F 1i (x), F
2
i (x)
)
+
∑n
i=1 supx∈X Ti
(∏
j∈I\{i} F
1
j (x),
∏
j∈I\{i} F
2
j (x)
)
where for each i ∈ I and for each j ∈ I \ {i}, Hi is the Hausdorff distance on the set
of subsets of the normed strategy space Ei and Ti is the Hausdorff distance on the set
of subsets of the product normed space
∏
j∈I\{i}Ej . Suppose that ρ is well defined (i.e.
has finite values); then V is a complete metric space. Now, we define the Berge’s strong
equilibria correspondence J : V → X, where for each v ∈ V , J(v) ⊂ X is the set of Berge’s
strong equilibria of the game. Then, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2. For an abstract economy defined on normed strategy spaces, under the
assumptions of Theorem 2.7, the Berge’s strong equilibrium correspondence J is upper
semicontinuous with nonempty and compact values.
Proof. The correspondence J has nonempty values by Theorem 2.7. We now prove that
the graph of J is closed. Let (vα, xα)α∈Λ be a net of the graph of J such that (vα, xα)→
(v, x) ∈ V ×X. Then for each α ∈ Λ, we have :
(3.12) ∀i ∈ I,∀j ∈ I \ {i}, xαi ∈ Fαi (xα),
and
(3.13) uαj (x
α
i , x
α
−i) = max
uαj (xαi , t−i) : t−i ∈ ∏
j∈I\{i}
F αj (x
α)
 .
LetM be any subset of a topological space S and denote byK(M) the set of convex subsets
of M endowed with the Vietoris topology (see Engelking (1968), p163). Recall that if S is
a metric space, then the Vietoris topology on K(M) coincides with the Hausdorff topology
induced by S on the compact subsets of M (see Klein and Thompson (1984), Corollary
4.2.3, p 41). We have:
(3.14) di(xi, Fi(x)) ≤ di(xi, x
α
i ) + di(x
α
i , F
α
i (x
α))+
Hi(Fαi (x
α), Fi(xα)) +Hi(Fi(xα), Fi(x)).
From (3.14), we obtain:
(3.15) di(xi, Fi(x)) ≤ di(xi, xαi ) + ρ(vα, v) +Hi(Fi(xα), Fi(x)).
Since for each i ∈ I, the correspondence Fi : X → Xi has compact values and is continuous,
Fi : X → K(Xi) is a continuous function and
(3.16) lim
α
Hi
(
Fi(xα), Fi(x)
)
= 0.
Passing to limit in (3.15), we obtain di(xi, Fi(x)) = 0 and then xi ∈ Fi(x). But Fi(x) is
compact, thus for each i ∈ I, xi ∈ Fi(x). For each i ∈ I and for each j ∈ I \ {i}, we have:
(3.17)
∣∣uαj (xαi , xα−i)− uj(xi, x−i)∣∣ ≤ ρ(vα, v) + ∣∣uj(xαi , xα−i)− uj(xi, x−i)∣∣ .
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For α large enough, we get :
(3.18) lim
α
uαj (x
α
i , x
α
−i) = uj(xi, x−i).
Since for each i ∈ I and for each j ∈ I \ {i}, the correspondence ∏j∈I\{i} Fj(x) is contin-
uous, then
(3.19) lim
α
Ti
( ∏
j∈I\{i}
Fj(xα),
∏
j∈I\{i}
Fj(x)
)
= 0.
From the definition of the distance ρ, we have:
(3.20) Ti
( ∏
j∈I\{i}
Fαj (x
α),
∏
j∈I\{i}
Fj(xα)
)
≤ ρ(vα, v).
Since
Ti
( ∏
j∈I\{i}
Fαj (x
α),
∏
j∈I\{i}
Fj(x)
)
≤ Ti
( ∏
j∈I\{i}
Fαj (x
α),
∏
j∈I\{i}
Fj(xα)
)
+
Ti
( ∏
j∈I\{i}
Fj(xα),
∏
j∈I\{i}
Fj(x)
)
,
(3.21)
then for α large enough, we have:
(3.22) ∀i ∈ I,∀j ∈ I \ {i}, lim
α
Ti
( ∏
j∈I\{i}
Fαj (x
α),
∏
j∈I\{i}
Fj(x)
)
= 0.
For each i ∈ I and for each j ∈ I \ {i}, xαi converges to xi and
(3.23) lim
α
sup
(xi,t)∈Xi×X−i
| uαj (xi, t)− uj(xi, t) |= 0.
Then by Lemma 2.5 in Yu (1999), we obtain:
(3.24) lim
α
max
t−i∈
Q
j∈I\{i}
Fαj (x
α)
uαj (x
α
i , t−i) = max
t−i∈
Q
j∈I\{i}
Fj(x)
uj(xi, t−i).
Using (3.13) and (3.18), we get:
(3.25) ∀i ∈ I,∀j ∈ I\ {i} , uj(xi, x−i) = max
t−i∈
Q
j∈I\{i}
Fj(x)
uj(xi, t−i).
It follows that for each i ∈ I and for each j ∈ I \ {i}, x ∈ J(v) and the graph of J is
closed. Then J has closed values in the compact set X and is upper semicontinuous.
In the particular case, where for each i ∈ I, Fi : X → CK(Xi) is a constant function
with values in CK(Xi), where CK(Xi) ⊂ K(Xi) denotes the set of compact and convex
subsets of Xi, we find the model(B) of the games parametrized by the payoff profiles
and the strategies sets (see Yu (1999), p.367). Then, under weaker conditions on Xi and
the strategy space Ei, we have the following theorem for games parametrized by strategy
profiles and strategy sets.
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Theorem 3.3. Under Assumptions B.2 – B.5 in Theorem 2.7 and if for each i ∈ I, Xi ⊂
Ei is closed and Ei is a Hausdorff topological vector space, the Berge’s strong equilibrium
correspondence J is upper semicontinuous with nonempty and compact values.
Proof. Let us consider the following noncooperative games (I, (Si)ni=1, (ui)
n
i=1) parametrized
by payoff profiles and strategy sets. From Theorem 2.4, J has nonempty values. Let
xα ∈ J(v) a net where v = (u1, · · · , un, S1, · · · , Sn) ∈ V and limα xα = x. Then, for
each i ∈ I and for each j ∈ I\ {i} , uj(xαi , xα−i) = max
t−i∈S−i
uj(xαi , t−i). It follows from the
continuity of ui and the maximum function, max
t−i∈S−i
uj(xi, t−i) = uj(xi, x−i). Hence, J has
closed values in the compact set
n∏
i=1
Si. Now, we prove that J is upper semicontinuous. If
it is not true at a point y ∈ V , then there exists an open set O of X and a net vα ∈ V
such that O ⊃ J(y), limα vα = v, xα ∈ J(vα) and xα /∈ O. Thus, limα ρ(uα, u) = 0 and for
each i ∈ I, limα Sαi = Si for the Vietoris topology on CK(Xi). In view of Lemma 2.3 in
Yu (1999), let x be a cluster point of xα. It is obvious that x /∈ O ⊃ J(y) and hence there
exists i0 ∈ I, j0 ∈ I\ {i0} and ε0 > 0 such that :
(3.26) uj0(xi0 , x−i0) < max
t−i0∈S−i0
uj0(xi0 , t−i0)− ε0 = uj0(xi0 , u0−i0)− ε0,
where u0−i0 ∈ S−i0 . Let X be a topological space and t ∈ X, we denote by O(t) any open
set of X which contains a point t. By the continuity of uj0 at points (xi0 , x−i0), (xi0 , u0−i0)
we have :
(3.27) ∀x′ ∈ O(xi0)×O(x−i0), uj0(x′i0 , x′−i0)− ε0/4 < uj0(xi0 , x−i0),
and
(3.28) ∀x′ ∈ O(xi0)×O(u0−i0), uj0(xi0 , u0−i0) < uj0(x′i0 , x′−i0) + ε0/4.
For each j ∈ I\ {i0}, let Vj
(
u0j
)
⊂ Xj an open set such that u0j ∈ Sj and
∏
j∈I\{i0}
Vj(u0j ) ⊂
O(u0−i0). Since Vj(u
0
j )∩Sj 6= ∅ then for α large enough, ρ(uα, u) < ε0/4, Vj(u0j )∩Sαj 6= ∅
and xα ∈ O(xi0)×O(x−i0). Take uα−i0 ∈ O(u0−i0) ∩
∏
j∈I\{i0}
Sαj . It is obvious that
(3.29) uαj0(x
α
i0 , x
α
−i0) < uj0(x
α
i0 , x
α
−i0) +
ε0
4
< uj0(xi0 , x−i0) +
ε0
2
.
From (3.26) we get :
(3.30) uαj0(x
α
i0 , x
α
−i0) < u
α
j0(x
α
i0 , u
α
−i0).
Since uα−i0 ∈ Sα−i0 , we obtain a contradiction with the assumption that xα is a net of
Berge’s strong equilibria.
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4. Essential equilibrium and games
In this section, as in Yu (1999), we prove that most (in the sense of Baire Category) of
games defined in subsections 3.1 and 3.2 are essential. Let Y be any one of spaces U, V
and T any one of the correspondences F, J (see subsections 3.1 and 3.2). Recall that the
Berge’s strong equilibrium correspondence T is upper semicontinuous and with nonempty
and compact values (see Theorems 3.1 and 3.2). For each x ∈ X and for each y ∈ Y,
we denote by V(x) the set of neighborhood of x and by W(y) the set of neighborhood of
y ∈ Y . Now, we give a definition of essential games.
Definition 4.1. (Yu (1999)). Let M be a nonempty and closed subset of Y and y ∈ M .
An element x ∈ T (y) is called essential equilibrium of the game y ∈ Y relative to M if
for any O ∈ V(x), there exists W ∈ W(y) such that for each y1 ∈ M ∩W , there exists
x1 ∈ T (y1) with x1 ∈ O.
It follows from this definition that the game y ∈ M is essential if and only if the
correspondence T : M → K(X) is lower semicontinuous at y (see Yu (1999), Theorem
4.1). In the following theorem, we prove that most of games y ∈ Y are essential.
Theorem 4.2. Assume that for each i ∈ I, the strategy space Ei is a normed space. Then
most of games in subsections 3.1 and 3.2 are essential.
Proof. Let M be a closed subset of Y and consider the corresponcence T : M → K(X).
Since Y is a complete metric space then M is a complete metric space. Thus M is a Baire
space. Also, as a subset of
∏
i∈I
Ei, X is a normed space. Since T is upper semicontinuous,
then applying Lemma 2.1 in Yu (1999), there exists a dense residual or a negligible subset
Q ( contains a countable intersection of open dense subsets) of M such that T is lower
semicontinuous on Q. Thus, most of games in subsections 3.1 and 3.2 are essential.
If Xi is closed in a Banach space Ei, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3. Most of games parametrized by payoff profiles and strategies sets are es-
sential.
Proof. Let M be a closed subset of V . Since Xi is closed in a Banach space Ei, then Xi is
a complete metric space. Applying Theorem 4.3.9 in Klein and Thompson (1984), K(Xi)
is a complete metric space. Since CK(Xi) ⊂ K(Xi) is closed (see Yu (1999), Lemma 2.2),
then CK(Xi) is a complete metric space and V = U ×
∏
i∈I
CK(Xi) is a complete metric
space. Then the conclusion of Theorem 4.3 follows from Theorem 3.3.
Remark 4.4. As noticed in Theorem 4.3 (see, Yu (1999)), all games in Y which have one
Berge’s strong equilibrium are essential.
In the following example, inspired by Example 1 (see Zhou and Xiang (2007)), we show
that not all games in subsection 3.1 are essential.
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Example 4.5. In this example, we consider a game in normal form with two persons
where the payoff function of each person is defined on the subset [−1, 1]× [0, 1] as follows:
(4.1) u1(x1, x2) = |x1| , u2(x1, x2) = x2.
It is easily seen that the set of Berge’s strong equilibria of this game is the set {(−1, 1), (1, 1)}.
Let us consider the sequence of payoff functions of each person defined on [−1, 1] × [0, 1]
by :
(4.2) un1 (x1, x2) =
{
l − x1 (x1, x2) ∈ [−1, 0]× [0, 1],
(1− 1n)x1 (x1, x2) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1],
and
(4.3) un2 (x1, x2) = (1−
1
n
)x2.
It is obvious that un1 and u
n
2 are continuous functions and that the set of Berge’s strong
equilibria of the sequence (un1 , u
n
2 ) is the set {(−1, 1)}. Since (un1 , un2 ) converges for the
distance ρ (see, subsection 3.1) to (u1, u2), then the Berge’s strong equilibrium point (1, 1)
is not essential. Similarly, the Berge’s strong equilibrium point (−1, 1) is not essential.
Indeed, it suffices to take:
(4.4) un1 (x1, x2) =
{
l − x1 (x1, x2) ∈ [−1, 0]× [0, 1],
(1 + 1n)x1 (x1, x2) ∈ [0, 1]× 0, 1],
and
(4.5) un2 (x1, x2) = (1 +
1
n
)x2.
Remark 4.6. As in Theorem 2 in Zhou and Xiang (2007), we can see that all games in
subsection 3.1 have a minimal essential set.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have given in Theorem 2.4 and Theorem 2.7 sufficient conditions
of existence for Berge’s strong equilibrium of cardinal noncooperative games and abstract
economies, i.e., of games and abstract economies where players’ preferences are represented
by payoff functions. The conditions A.1 – A.4 of Theorem 2.4 (resp. conditions B.1 –
B.4 of Theorem 2.7) are standard but condition A.5 (resp. B.5) is difficult to verify.
Theorem 2.4 extends the result of Larbani and Nessah (2001) to infinite dimensional
strategy spaces. Furthermore, as in Yu (1999) for the Nash games, we have shown through
Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 that most of Berge’s strong games and abstract economies are
essential in the sense of Baire Category. That is, there are cases for which Berge’s strong
games are not essential. Example 2 illustrates one of these cases. In future work, we will
address the equilibrium existence problem for ordinal Berge strong games and abstract
economies, i.e., for games where players’ preferences do not admit payoff representations.
We will also try to get equilibrium existence under more flexible conditions than A.5 of
Theorem 2.4 and B.5 of Theorem 2.7.
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Appendix
Proposition 5.1. The set U endowed with the distance ρ is a complete metric space.
Proof. Let up = (up1 · · · , upn) ∈ U be a Cauchy sequence. Let us prove that up converges to
u = ( u1, · · · , un) ∈ U . By the definition of the set U and ρ, we have for each i = 1, · · · , n
and for each m ∈ N, upi is a bounded function on X and
(5.1)
∀i = 1, · · · , n,∀ > 0,∃n0() ∈ N : ∀m ≥ n0(),∀q ≥ n0()⇒
sup
x∈X
| umi (x)− uqi (x) |≤ .
Let B(X) be the complete vector space of all bounded real functions on X endowed with
the uniform metric. Then from (5.1), umi converges to the function ui ∈ B(X). It follows:
(5.2) ∀i = 1, · · · , n,∀ > 0,∃n0() ∈ N,∀m ≥ n0()⇒ sup
x∈X
| umi (x)− ui(x) |≤ .
Set u = (u1, · · · , un). Then
n∑
i=1
sup
x∈X
| ui(x) |<∞. It is obvious that ui is quasi-concave (as
uniform limit of quasi-concave functions umi ). Now, we show that ui is upper semicontin-
uous on X. Let xα a net in X such that xα converges to x. Since
(5.3) ui(x)− ui(xα) = ui(x)− umi (x) + umi (x)− umi (xα) + umi (xα)− ui(xα),
then from (5.2), we have:
(5.4) −2+ umi (x)− umi (xα) ≤ ui(x)− ui(xα) ≤ 2+ umi (x)− umi (xα).
Passing to limit with respect to α in “Eq.(5.4)” and taking → 0, we get :
(5.5)
lim
α
sup(umi (x)− umi (xα)) ≤ limα sup(ui(x)− ui(xα)) ≤
lim
α
sup(umi (x)− umi (xα)).
Since umi is upper semicontinuous, we have :
umi (x)− limα supu
m
i (xα) = 0.
We obtain :
ui(x)− lim
α
supui(xα) = 0.
Thus, ui is upper semicontinuous. Similarly, we can prove that
ui(x)− lim
α
inf ui(xα) = 0
and ui is lower semicontinuous.
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